Texas Bill Nukes Tenure

[ciao_yall]

My only question is, who are these risk averse PhDs that currently aren't seeking tenure track jobs? What are they up to now? Why would they want a job with poor job security and low pay?

The less risk averse are applying already. Having fewer more risk averse applicants leaves extra room for these people.

My point is that the best don't value tenure.

I think I'm darn good at my job, and I valued tenure when I had it. It meant I could do my best work without some admincritter who didn't understand my field try to interfere with my work to make some random board member happy or get their name on a press release.

I chose to give up tenure to move into administration to get paid more. Full stop.

And now in administration I sometimes do my best work only to to have some random board member or inept admincritter pull rank on me so they can aggrandize themselves and/or get a nice quote in a press release.

[Caracal]

My only question is, who are these risk averse PhDs that currently aren't seeking tenure track jobs? What are they up to now? Why would they want a job with poor job security and low pay?

The less risk averse are applying already. Having fewer more risk averse applicants leaves extra room for these people.

My point is that the best don't value tenure.

I think I'm darn good at my job, and I valued tenure when I had it. It meant I could do my best work without some admincritter who didn't understand my field try to interfere with my work to make some random board member happy or get their name on a press release.

I chose to give up tenure to move into administration to get paid more. Full stop.

And now in administration I sometimes do my best work only to to have some random board member or inept admincritter pull rank on me so they can aggrandize themselves and/or get a nice quote in a press release.

Most of the people I know value tenure because it allows them to set their own benchmarks. The nature of academic work is that you can always be doing more. Not just with research, but with service, and showing up to every damn event. Tenure allows people to work on a long term project that may not produce anything publishable in the short term, explore ideas that may not go anywhere at all, or just take a break to recharge rather than charging into the next project without really having the time to consider whether its what they want to do. It also allows them to make choice about what to attend and skip based on actual importance, instead of just feeling a need to be there for brownie points or your perception about what the senior person in your department with the worst work life balance thinks you should be doing.

[marshwiggle]

This may seem like a strange comparison, but there are professions where some people choose to be "temps" rather than have an ongoing contract with one specific employer. Salaries for temp workers have to be higher. Why do companies hire temps when it's going to cost them more in salary plus all of the overhead for the temp agency? Because the contracts can be as long (or short) as necessary, and there's no need to "fire" anyone who doesn't work out.
For academics in fields that don't need a lot of infrastructure like labs and equipment, some people may be willing to take a higher salary with less job security. If an institution needs to hire someone, they'll need to make the salary high enough to get someone. But not having to make a long term commitment may make the higher salary in the short term worth it to the institution as well. All kinds of places that hire massive numbers of adjuncts now instead of fewer full-time positions might reverse that trend when there's more flexibility about getting rid of people if enrollment declines.

As I said earlier, this will unfold over time, and what is workable in the long run will become apparent.

[Sun_Worshiper]

My only question is, who are these risk averse PhDs that currently aren't seeking tenure track jobs? What are they up to now? Why would they want a job with poor job security and low pay?

The less risk averse are applying already. Having fewer more risk averse applicants leaves extra room for these people.

My point is that the best don't value tenure.

So in other words there is no risk seeking population that will be attracted to these jobs, it is just the people who weren't competitive enough to get them in the first place.

And your point is nonsensical: Why wouldn't the best value a major job benefit? "Oh I'm a really good teacher and researcher, so I don't want job security."

I won't even ask what evidence you are basing this on, since the answer is obviously none.

[marshwiggle]

My only question is, who are these risk averse PhDs that currently aren't seeking tenure track jobs? What are they up to now? Why would they want a job with poor job security and low pay?

The less risk averse are applying already. Having fewer more risk averse applicants leaves extra room for these people.

My point is that the best don't value tenure.

So in other words there is no risk seeking population that will be attracted to these jobs, it is just the people who weren't competitive enough to get them in the first place.

And your point is nonsensical: Why wouldn't the best value a major job benefit? "Oh I'm a really good teacher and researcher, so I don't want job security."

I won't even ask what evidence you are basing this on, since the answer is obviously none.

I'm guessing it's like the fact that many of the most productive employees don't like unions; employers with any brains know who the people are who punch above their weight and will try to hang on to them. The "security" offered by things like unions is most beneficial to the people who would be easiest for the organization to lose.

[Sun_Worshiper]

My only question is, who are these risk averse PhDs that currently aren't seeking tenure track jobs? What are they up to now? Why would they want a job with poor job security and low pay?

The less risk averse are applying already. Having fewer more risk averse applicants leaves extra room for these people.

My point is that the best don't value tenure.

So in other words there is no risk seeking population that will be attracted to these jobs, it is just the people who weren't competitive enough to get them in the first place.

And your point is nonsensical: Why wouldn't the best value a major job benefit? "Oh I'm a really good teacher and researcher, so I don't want job security."

I won't even ask what evidence you are basing this on, since the answer is obviously none.

I'm guessing it's like the fact that many of the most productive employees don't like unions; employers with any brains know who the people are who punch above their weight and will try to hang on to them. The "security" offered by things like unions is most beneficial to the people who would be easiest for the organization to lose.

I'm guessing he's just trolling.

"Employees with brains don't want job security" - listen to yourself.

Tenure is the thing that allows the best and brightest to undertake ambitious research projects that may ruffle some feathers. Get rid of it in one state (especially in these highly politicized ways that intend to give Republican officials the power to fire faculty for their politics) and watch the best folks leave for greener pastures. Those that stay will be forced to try to hit annual KPIs, which will encourage quantity over quality and unethical research behavior.

[aprof]

There are NOT tons of adjuncts in the hard sciences and math that can do research. I've said it before, but as long as the US depends on universities to produce high quality research in hard sciences and math ANYTHING that is perceived to make the job less desirable (including doing away with tenure) is, imho, a bad thing.

Note: I no longer personally have a need for tenure as an old retired person.

Yes, dismalist's claim that there are so many adjuncts just waiting for these positions does not match my experience in STEM.  We can't hire enough people to fill TT positions, especially in certain hot areas.  Sure, we can find someone to teach the core undergraduate curriculum but it's much more difficult to find someone from local industry (that's our only option - again, no pool of qualified adjuncts sitting around waiting for openings) to teach MS and PhD level courses.  The industry people we do find to adjunct often don't return because the pay is terrible for the amount of work.

In terms of research, obviously one needs permanent employees.

[mleok]

I'm guessing it's like the fact that many of the most productive employees don't like unions; employers with any brains know who the people are who punch above their weight and will try to hang on to them. The "security" offered by things like unions is most beneficial to the people who would be easiest for the organization to lose.

That's a red herring. At my institution, it would be hard to unionize the tenured faculty because many of us value the ability to negotiate salaries on an individual basis. But we would all be up in arms if there was any threat to tenure.

[Sun_Worshiper]

Since all the top faculty apparently don't like tenure, there is probably a big group of the best and brightest clambering to end it... Right?

[mleok]

Tenure is the thing that allows the best and brightest to undertake ambitious research projects that may ruffle some feathers. Get rid of it in one state (especially in these highly politicized ways that intend to give Republican officials the power to fire faculty for their politics) and watch the best folks leave for greener pastures. Those that stay will be forced to try to hit annual KPIs, which will encourage quantity over quality and unethical research behavior.

Indeed, the main appeal of academia is the ability to pursue long-term research projects that may not be aligned with external funding priorities, and tenure is a critical part of allowing academic researchers to pursue such goals.

[mleok]

Since all the top faculty apparently don't like tenure, there is probably a big group of the best and brightest clambering to end it... Right?

Dismalist probably fancies themself as one of them.

[marshwiggle]

Since all the top faculty apparently don't like tenure, there is probably a big group of the best and brightest clambering to end it... Right?

Dismalist probably fancies themself as one of them.

I think Dismalist and I disagree about the whether the unfettered market is the best way to reach equilibrium.

In physics terms, unfettered markets produce an underdamped system, where there can be lots of oscillation before the system eventually reaches equilibrium. A communist system (or any system with lots of bureaucracy) produces an overdamped system, where there's no oscillation but it takes a very long time to reach equilibrium.  The role of government (in my view) is to try and produce a critically damped system which reaches equilibrium without oscillation as quickly as possible.

[dismalist]

Since all the top faculty apparently don't like tenure, there is probably a big group of the best and brightest clambering to end it... Right?

Dismalist probably fancies themself as one of them.

I think Dismalist and I disagree about the whether the unfettered market is the best way to reach equilibrium.

In physics terms, unfettered markets produce an underdamped system, where there can be lots of oscillation before the system eventually reaches equilibrium. A communist system (or any system with lots of bureaucracy) produces an overdamped system, where there's no oscillation but it takes a very long time to reach equilibrium.  The role of government (in my view) is to try and produce a critically damped system which reaches equilibrium without oscillation as quickly as possible.

The dynamics of individual markets are well understood. If price rises in the face of excess demand and falls in the face of excess supply, the market is stable without oscillations. There's no reason to believe that's not the case in higher ed. So comparative statics is safe to pursue.

But as for the rest, the effect of abolishing tenure on higher ed in Texas is a technical question that can be answered without respect to anybody's motives. It is also fascinating to see academics get really upset about tenure. It is like our holy grail. No, it's just another perk.

It's not that good people don't value tenure. They don't value it as much as less good people. They don't demand the removal of tenure, but they react to it differently than less good people. They have no reason to leave, for they are safe on account of their quality.

Now, for the tenure track people, if they are relatively sure of their high quality, they will stay. They like the academy. Those unsure will leave with little in the way of higher wages on the outside. The reserve army of adjuncts moves in.  Wages do not rise.

It is indeed true that where there are no adjuncts, say in STEM, wages might have to rise to offset the loss of tenure. Or the institutions could shrink.

[pondering]

Since all the top faculty apparently don't like tenure, there is probably a big group of the best and brightest clambering to end it... Right?

Dismalist probably fancies themself as one of them.

I think Dismalist and I disagree about the whether the unfettered market is the best way to reach equilibrium.

In physics terms, unfettered markets produce an underdamped system, where there can be lots of oscillation before the system eventually reaches equilibrium. A communist system (or any system with lots of bureaucracy) produces an overdamped system, where there's no oscillation but it takes a very long time to reach equilibrium.  The role of government (in my view) is to try and produce a critically damped system which reaches equilibrium without oscillation as quickly as possible.

The dynamics of individual markets are well understood. If price rises in the face of excess demand and falls in the face of excess supply, the market is stable without oscillations. There's no reason to believe that's not the case in higher ed. So comparative statics is safe to pursue.

But as for the rest, the effect of abolishing tenure on higher ed in Texas is a technical question that can be answered without respect to anybody's motives. It is also fascinating to see academics get really upset about tenure. It is like our holy grail. No, it's just another perk.

It's not that good people don't value tenure. They don't value it as much as less good people. They don't demand the removal of tenure, but they react to it differently than less good people. They have no reason to leave, for they are safe on account of their quality.

Now, for the tenure track people, if they are relatively sure of their high quality, they will stay. They like the academy. Those unsure will leave with little in the way of higher wages on the outside. The reserve army of adjuncts moves in.  Wages do not rise.

It is indeed true that where there are no adjuncts, say in STEM, wages might have to rise to offset the loss of tenure. Or the institutions could shrink.

Your obsession with seeing the issue of tenure purely in terms of a market consisting of rational actors misses other essential factors. External forces that shape working conditions in higher education - state governments and the boards of governors and trustees they appoint - can make tenure an important protection against other "risks" apart from under-performance/"low quality" teaching and research. Political, ideological, and plain uninformed reasoning shapes the decision-making of these actors, and tenure in its current form in most places protects against their capricious or arbitrary desire to (for instance) lay off professors in subject areas they deem hostile to their agenda or simply a waste of money. As we've seen in some UK universities (where there are no tenure protections or collective bargaining agreements enshrining employment terms for tenured professors), extremely high performers (people who brought in millions in funding, published ground-breaking research prolifically, etc.) have nevertheless been laid off ("made redundant" in UK terms) because a new vice-chancellor or management team viewed their disciplinary expertise as irrelevant to the direction in which they wanted to take the university. In the US, tenure generally protects against that sort of thing by limiting layoffs to situations of genuine financial exigency (and even then, most CBAs specify that tenured professors will be the last to lose their jobs).

In short, you can be the "best" or "highest quality" person in your field, but if people in power decide they're not interested in your field being offered at their university any more, and you don't have the contractual protections of tenure, you could lose your job. That makes tenure an extremely valuable job characteristic even for the highest performers.

[dismalist]

Since all the top faculty apparently don't like tenure, there is probably a big group of the best and brightest clambering to end it... Right?

Dismalist probably fancies themself as one of them.

I think Dismalist and I disagree about the whether the unfettered market is the best way to reach equilibrium.

In physics terms, unfettered markets produce an underdamped system, where there can be lots of oscillation before the system eventually reaches equilibrium. A communist system (or any system with lots of bureaucracy) produces an overdamped system, where there's no oscillation but it takes a very long time to reach equilibrium.  The role of government (in my view) is to try and produce a critically damped system which reaches equilibrium without oscillation as quickly as possible.

The dynamics of individual markets are well understood. If price rises in the face of excess demand and falls in the face of excess supply, the market is stable without oscillations. There's no reason to believe that's not the case in higher ed. So comparative statics is safe to pursue.

But as for the rest, the effect of abolishing tenure on higher ed in Texas is a technical question that can be answered without respect to anybody's motives. It is also fascinating to see academics get really upset about tenure. It is like our holy grail. No, it's just another perk.

It's not that good people don't value tenure. They don't value it as much as less good people. They don't demand the removal of tenure, but they react to it differently than less good people. They have no reason to leave, for they are safe on account of their quality.

Now, for the tenure track people, if they are relatively sure of their high quality, they will stay. They like the academy. Those unsure will leave with little in the way of higher wages on the outside. The reserve army of adjuncts moves in.  Wages do not rise.

It is indeed true that where there are no adjuncts, say in STEM, wages might have to rise to offset the loss of tenure. Or the institutions could shrink.

Your obsession with seeing the issue of tenure purely in terms of a market consisting of rational actors misses other essential factors. External forces that shape working conditions in higher education - state governments and the boards of governors and trustees they appoint - can make tenure an important protection against other "risks" apart from under-performance/"low quality" teaching and research. Political, ideological, and plain uninformed reasoning shapes the decision-making of these actors, and tenure in its current form in most places protects against their capricious or arbitrary desire to (for instance) lay off professors in subject areas they deem hostile to their agenda or simply a waste of money. As we've seen in some UK universities (where there are no tenure protections or collective bargaining agreements enshrining employment terms for tenured professors), extremely high performers (people who brought in millions in funding, published ground-breaking research prolifically, etc.) have nevertheless been laid off ("made redundant" in UK terms) because a new vice-chancellor or management team viewed their disciplinary expertise as irrelevant to the direction in which they wanted to take the university. In the US, tenure generally protects against that sort of thing by limiting layoffs to situations of genuine financial exigency (and even then, most CBAs specify that tenured professors will be the last to lose their jobs).

In short, you can be the "best" or "highest quality" person in your field, but if people in power decide they're not interested in your field being offered at their university any more, and you don't have the contractual protections of tenure, you could lose your job. That makes tenure an extremely valuable job characteristic even for the highest performers.

I'm not obsessed. Everyone else is. :-)

Of course tenure is a perk. The highest quality people value it less I explained, not at zero.. Now, in a big market such as the United States, any good academic capriciously made redundant will immediately find a new job. In a small market, such as the UK, that is much less likely. Of course, for the very best people, there is a world market.

A different kettle of fish is the question of why and how arbitrary and capricious firings are and can be made. That can only be done if revenue is guaranteed independent of performance. Letting the money follow the student would solve that problem even in small markets. Firings could no longer be arbitrary and capricious.